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The AfD’s Winning Formula – No Need for 
Economic Strategy Blurring in Germany
Western European Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRPs) have addressed the dispersed 
socio-economic status of their electorates by blurring  their economic positioning. This 
contribution analyses the rise of the German PRRP Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) between 
2013 and 2017 and the role of its economic policy platform. In contrast to its European 
peers, the AfD shows few signs of economic strategy blurring. The party offers clear anti-
redistribution policies that are matched by AfD voters’ preferences: even the least affl uent AfD 
supporters have stronger preferences for lower redistribution than the most affl uent non-AfD 
supporters. For AfD supporters with lower socio-economic positions this means that they 
support economic policies that are against their economic interests. Extreme authoritarian 
cultural policies spiced up with criticism of the establishment and combined with a general 
opposition to redistribution can be identifi ed as the AfD’s winning formula. Within the Western 
European PRRP party family, this winning formula directed at supporters with lower socio-
economic positions constitutes an exception.
DOI: 10.1007/s10272-020-0868-2
Matthias Diermeier, German Economic Institute 
(IW), Cologne; and University of Duisburg-Essen, 
Germany.
The Western European party family of Populist Radical 
Right Parties has gone through a vivid transformation.1 
Particularly, PRRPs’ economic positioning has become 
an object of study as they shift away from neo-liberal eco-
nomic policy platforms and as the parties increasingly 
attract an electorate with lower socio-economic status.2 
Today, the Western European political landscape holds a 
variety of strategies for PRRP’s potential economic pol-
icy. These range from the French Front National model 
of endorsing pro-welfare policies to the Swiss Peoples 
© The Author(s) 2020. Open Access: This article is distributed under the 
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License 
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
 Open Access funding provided by ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre 
for Economics.
1 C. M u d d e : Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, New York 2007, 
Cambridge University Press.
2 E. I v a r s f l a t e n : The vulnerable populist right parties: No economic 
realignment fuelling their electoral success, in: European Journal of 
Political Research, Vol. 44, No. 3, 2005, pp. 465-492; A. A f o n s o , L. 
R e n w a l d : The Changing Welfare State Agenda of Radical Right Par-
ties in Europe, in: B. P a l i e r, P. M a n o w  (eds.): Electoral Politics and 
Welfare State Reforms, Oxford 2018, Oxford University Press.
Party’s well-known ‘winning formula’ of ‘right’ cultural po-
sitions and a neoliberal economic policy. Applying more 
nuanced strategies, PRRPs persuade their supporters 
by subsuming the economic dimension under their cul-
tural core position or by blurring its economic policy.3 In 
this regard, the German newcomer party Alternative für 
Deutschland (AfD) appears to be a prime object of study 
as it goes through a similar transformation, albeit in fast-
forward between 2013 and 2017.4
 PRRPs in a multidimensional context
 In contrast to the belief that party competition is mostly 
carried out along unidimensional confl ict lines on the eco-
nomic dimension, scholars following Riker’s heresthetics 
stress the importance of different dimensions, including 
non-economic issues as well as party competition, over 
dimensional salience.5 Rovny and Edwards note that “po-
litical competition is primarily a struggle over dimension-
ality, it does not merely occur along issue dimensions but 
also over their content” – with special incentives for niche 
3 A. E l i a s , E. S z ö c s i k , C.I. Z u b e r : Position, selective emphasis 
and framing, in: Party Politics, Vol. 21, No. 6, 2015, pp. 839-850; J. 
R o v n y : Where do radical right parties stand? Position blurring in 
multidimensional competition, in: European Political Science Review, 
Vol. 5, No. 1, 2013, pp. 1-26.
4 K. A r z h e i m e r, C.C. B e r n i n g : How the Alternative for Germany 
(AfD) and their voters veered to the radical right, 2013-2017, in: Elec-
toral Studies, Vol. 60, 2019.
5 W.H. R i k e r : The Art of Political Manipulation, New Haven 1986, Yale 
University Press.
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parties to introduce secondary, non-economic issues.6 
Norris and Inglehart fi nd a predominance of the cultural 
dimension and christen the rise of PRRPs in Western de-
mocracies a cultural backlash:7 an uprising against the dif-
fusion of progressive values and the approval of migra-
tion, channelled through nativist, authoritarian and popu-
list radical right parties.8
Regarding the welfare policy platforms of PRRPs, 
Kitschelt and McGann sketch the ‘winning formula’ as a 
neo-liberal economic agenda with an authoritarian pro-
fi le in the cultural and political dimension.9 This formula 
has become highly controversial as the heterogeneity of 
Western European PRRPs is carved out in bits and piec-
es.10 First, PRRPs are considered, to a certain degree, 
Anti-Party Parties (APPs) that discredit the political sys-
tem as such.11 If PRRPs were to opportunistically endorse 
whichever goal appeals to their electorate, they would at-
tract more protest voters than issue voters, resulting in a 
generally lower importance of actual issue positioning.12 
Second, some PRRPs – e.g. the Front National under 
Marine Le Pen – meet lower socio-economic positions of 
their electorates programmatically with a shift to pro-wel-
fare positions.13 Third, a centrist convergence of PRRPs 
in the economic policy dimension during the 1990s and 
2000s can be observed – e.g. in Belgium and the Neth-
erlands – with PRRPs proposing an absurd socio-eco-
nomic agenda of economic liberalism and a welfare 
state.14 In this context, Mudde and Ivarsfl aten stress the 
6 J. R o v n y, E.E. E d w a rd s : Struggle over Dimensionality: Party Com-
petition in Western and Eastern Europe, in: East European Politics & 
Societies, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2012, pp. 56-74, here p. 56.
7  P. N o r r i s , R. I n g l e h a r t : Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Au-
thoritarian Populism, Cambridge 2019, Cabridge University Press.
8 C. M u d d e : Populist Radical… , op. cit.
9 H. K i t s c h e l t , A. M c G a n n : The Radical Right in Western Europe: 
A Comparative Analysis, Ann Arbor 1995, The University of Michigan 
Press.
10 See M. R o o d u i j n : What unites the voter bases of populist parties? 
Comparing the electorates of 15 populist parties, in: European Politi-
cal Science Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2018, pp. 351-368 for a discussion 
of the differences of Western European PRRPs’ electorates and their 
redistribution preferences. See S. O t j e s , G. I v a l d i , A.R. J u p s k å s , 
O. M a z z o l e n i : It’s not Economic Interventionism, Stupid! Reas-
sessing the Political Economy of Radical Right-wing Populist Parties, 
in: Swiss Political Science Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2018, p. 271 for cur-
rent empirical evidence of the diversity of Western European PRRPs’ 
economic agenda.
11 T. P o g u n k e , S.E. S c a r ro w : The politics of anti-party sentiment: In-
troduction1, in: European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 29, No. 3, 
1996, pp. 257-262.
12 K. D e s c h o u v e r : Political parties and democracy: A mutual mur-
der?, in: European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 29, No. 3, 1996, 
pp. 263-278.
13 A. A f o n s o , L. R e n w a l d , op. cit; Z. L e f k o f r i d i , E. M i c h e l : The 
Electoral Politics of Solidarity, in: K. B a n t i n g , W. K y m l i c k a  (eds.): 
The Strains of Commitment, 2017, Oxford University Press.
14 C. M u d d e : Populist Radical… , op. cit. For Belgium and the Nether-
lands, see S.L. de Lange: A New Winning Formula?, in: Party Politics, 
Vol. 13, No. 4, 2007, pp. 411-435.
welfare chauvinist character of PRRP’s economic policy 
platforms and fi nd that PRRPs subsume their economic 
policy under a cultural core issue, in order to address dis-
persed preferences for redistribution – e.g. in Denmark 
and France.15 Fourth, Rovny claims that radical ‘right’ par-
ties deliberately cloud their positioning in the economic 
dimension as they focus on cultural issues, allowing them 
to attract an electorate with heterogeneous redistribution 
and homogeneous cultural preferences.16 Finally, the old 
winning formula of anti-migration and anti-redistribution 
attitudes seems to be a driver of PRRP support in Swit-
zerland and, to a lesser degree, in Norway.17 However, in 
contrast to most Western European PRRPs, the Swiss 
People’s Party and the Norwegian Progress Party still at-
tract a rather affl uent electorate.
Following Elias et al.’s theoretical elaboration of the out-
lined bi-dimensional setting, parties can either choose to 
reveal a position in both dimensions (bi-dimensionality) or 
ignore one dimension entirely (uni-dimensionality).18 Also, 
parties may deliberately blur one dimension (blurring) or 
subsume it under the other dimension (subsuming). De-
pending on the characteristics of the respective party 
system and dimensional salience relation, this theoretical 
framing describes the possible strategy space for PRRPs.
Shaking up the Party System: AfD
The German party system may be considered a prime 
example of the described theoretical strategy setting. It 
can be outlined through a socio-economic cleavage over 
market freedom and state interventionism and a cultural 
cleavage between a libertarian and an authoritarian ex-
treme.19 Also, polarisation between political parties in-
creased signifi cantly during the 2013 and 2017 election 
periods.20 Characterised as a two party-dominated politi-
cal system, the decade-long decay of the election share 
of the social democratic SPD and the conservative CDU/
CSU is mirrored by a shift to the left of the entire party 
15 See C. M u d d e : Extreme right parties in Eastern Europe, in: Patterns 
of Prejudice, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2000, pp. 5-27; and S. O t j e s  et al., op. 
cit. Note popular defi nition of PRRPs’ ‘thin ideology’ by C. M u d d e : 
Populist Radical… , op. cit. misses a clear defi nition of the economic 
agenda.
16 See J. R o v n y : Where do radical… , op. cit.; and Z. S o m e r- To p c u : 
Everything to Everyone: The Electoral Consequences of the Broad-
Appeal Strategy in Europe, in: American Journal of Political Science, 
Vol. 59, No. 4, 2015, pp. 841-854; A. A f o n s o , L. R e n w a l d , op. cit.
17 M. R o o d u i j n , op. cit.
18 A. E l i a s , E. S z ö c s i k , C.I. Z u b e r, op. cit.
19 O. N i e d e r m a y e r : Von der Zweiparteiendominanz zum Pluralismus: 
Die Entwicklung des deutschen Parteiensystems im westeuropäis-
chen Vergleich, in: Politische Vierteljahrsschrift, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2010, 
pp. 1-13.
20 K.-R. K o r t e , D. M i c h e l s , J. S c h o o f s , N. S w i t e k , K. We i s s e n -
b a c h : Parteiendemokratie in Bewegung, 2018, Nomos.
ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
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system.21 Traditionally leaving potential PRRPs little room 
to manoeuvre,22 the CDU/CSU has gradually converged 
to centre-right positions since the 1990s, leaving a ‘repre-
sentational gap’ on the far right of the cultural party com-
petition dimension.23
Today, this far-right void is successively absorbed by 
the AfD. Established in 2013, the party’s founding father, 
professor of economics Bernd Lucke, initially designed a 
single-issue Eurosceptic party24 dominated by its liberal,25 
ordoliberal26 or neo-liberal27 economic policy platform. 
During this founding period, the party attracted a particu-
larly affl uent and highly educated electorate.28 The par-
ty’s fi rst manifestos lack clear nativist and populist ele-
ments that are typical of the cultural policy positioning of 
PRRPs.29
After a tough factional struggle, the AfD’s positioning in 
the cultural dimension was signifi cantly radicalised by 
the national conservative wing having sacked Lucke as a 
spokesperson in July 2015. Scholars describe the post-
Lucke programmatic adjustments as a shift to an anti-
migration party30 or a populist right-wing party.31 During 
this radicalisation period, the party’s important social me-
dia communication focused more and more on the topics 
21 O. N i e d e r m a y e r : Von der Zweiparteiendominanz… , op. cit.
22 S. B o r n s c h i e r : Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right: The New 
Cultural Confl ict in Western Europe, Philadelphia, PA 2010, Temple 
University Press.
23 K.-R. K o r t e , D. M i c h e l s , J. S c h o o f s , N. S w i t e k , K. We i s s e n -
b a c h , op. cit., p. 206; D. A r t : The AfD and the end of containment 
in Germany, in: German Politics and Society, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2018, 
pp. 76-86; 
24 R. S c h m i t t - B e c k : The ‘Alternative für Deutschland in the Elector-
ate’: Between Single-Issue and Right-Wing Populist Party, in: German 
Politics, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2017, pp. 124-148.
25 J. S c h ä rd e l : Vom euroskeptischen Herausforderer zur rechtsex-
tremen Gefahr? Eine Untersuchung der regionalen Berichterstattung 
über die AfD in neun deutschen Landtagswahlkämpfen, in: Zeitschrift 
für Parlamentsfragen, Vol. 48, No. 1, 2017, pp. 76-101.
26 S.T. F r a n z m a n n : Calling the Ghost of Populism: The AfD’s Strategic 
and Tactical Agendas until the EP Election 2014, in: German Politics, 
Vol. 25, No. 4, 2016, pp. 457-479.
27 J. R o s e n f e l d e r : Die Programmatik der AfD: Inwiefern hat sie sich 
von einer primär euroskeptischen zu einer rechtspopulistischen Par-
tei entwickelt?, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, Vol. 48, No. 1, 
2017, pp. 123-140.
28 O. N i e d e r m a y e r, J. H o f r i c h t e r : Die Wählerschaft der AfD: Wer ist 
sie, woher kommt sie und wie weit rechts steht sie?, in: Zeitschrift für 
Parlamentsfragen, Vol. 47, No. 2, 2016, pp. 267-285.
29 K. A r z h e i m e r : The AfD: Finally a Successful Right-Wing Populist 
Eurosceptic Party for Germany?, in: West European Politics, Vol. 38, 
No. 3, 2015, pp. 535-556; O. N i e d e r m a y e r : Eine neue Konkurrentin 
im Parteiensystem? Die Alternative für Deutschland, in: O. N i e d e r-
m a y e r  (ed.): Die Parteien nach der Bundestagswahl 2013, Wies-
baden 2015, Springer, pp. 175-207.
30 O. N i e d e r m a y e r, J. H o f r i c h t e r, op. cit.
31 N. B e r b u i r, M. L e w a n d o w s k y, J. S i r i : The AfD and its Sympa-
thisers: Finally a Right-Wing Populist Movement in Germany?, in: Ger-
man Politics, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2015, pp. 154-178; J. R o s e n f e l d e r, op. 
cit.
of migration and Islam.32 The AfD’s gradual development 
into a nationwide competitive PRRP peaked with its his-
torical success at the federal level in 2017, when the party 
won 12.6% of the votes, thus abruptly ending the long-
term absence of a German PRRP.33 The party’s classifi ca-
tion by the public34 and the media35 moved to the ‘right’ 
accordingly. At the same time, AfD supporters kept their 
strong homogeneity in the cultural dimension, e.g. in their 
opposition to migration.36
The programmatic transformation has been accompa-
nied by socio-economic changes within the AfD’s support 
groups. Support from groups with lower socio-econom-
ic status, especially in Eastern Germany and within the 
working class, increased while support from high-income 
groups decreased.37 Accordingly, voter migration to the 
AfD differs with the incumbency on the regional level and 
comes from the Left party in Eastern Germany, from the 
CDU in major cities in Eastern German, from the CSU 
in Bavaria and the SPD in the Ruhr area.38 In contrast to 
former radical right-wing parties in Germany, the mobili-
sation of a certain traditional left-leaning electorate rep-
resents a unique feature of the AfD.39 The AfD manages 
to attract a diverse electorate and mobilises non-voters 
as well as voters of several established parties.40 Where-
32 K. A r z h e i m e r, C.C. B e r n i n g , op. cit.
33 S. B o r n s c h i e r : Why a right-wing populist party emerged in France 
but not in Germany: cleavages and actors in the formation of a new 
cultural divide, in: European Political Science Review, Vol. 4, No. 1, 
2012, pp. 121-145; O. N i e d e r m a y e r : Von der Zweiparteiendomi-
nanz… , op. cit.
34 K. B e rg m a n n , M. D i e r m e i e r : Die AfD: Eine unterschätzte Partei 
Soziale Erwünschtheit als Erklärung für fehlerhafte Prognosen, in: IW 
Report, No. 7, 2017.
35 J. S c h ä rd e l , op. cit.
36 H. L e n g f e l d : Die „Alternative für Deutschland“: eine Partei für Mod-
ernisierungsverlierer?, in: KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und 
Sozialpsychologie, Vol. 69, No. 2, 2017, pp. 209-232; T. S c h w a r z b ö -
z l , M. F a t k e : Außer Protesten nichts gewesen? Das politische Po-
tenzial der AfD, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Vol. 57, No. 2, 2016, 
pp. 276-299.
37 K. B e rg m a n n , M. D i e r m e i e r, J. N i e h u e s : Ein komplexes Gebil-
de. Eine sozio-ökonomische Analyse des Ergebnisses der AfD bei der 
Bundestagswahl 2017, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, Vol. 49, 
No. 2, 2018, pp. 243-264; K. B re n k e , A. K r i t i k o s : Wählerstruk-
tur im Wandel, in: DIW Wochenbericht, No. 29, 2017; I. B i e b e r, S. 
R o ß t e u t s c h e r, P. S c h e re r : Die Metamorphosen der AfD-Wähler-
schaft: Von einer euroskeptischen Protestpartei zu einer (r)echten Al-
ternative?, in: Politische Vierteljahrsschrift, Vol. 59, 2018, pp. 433-461.
38 J. O l s e n : The left party and the AfD: Populist Competitors in East-
ern Germany, in: German Politics and Society, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2018, 
pp. 70-83; K. B e rg m a n n , M. D i e r m e i e r, J. N i e h u e s , 2008, 
op. cit.; L. B e rg , A. Z i c k  (ed.): Rechtspopulismus, soziale Frage & 
Demokratie: S. K u r t e n b a c h : Räumliche Aspekte des Rechtspop-
ulismus, FGW-Studie, No. 1, Düsseldorf 2019.
39 M. K l e i n , F. H e c k e r t , Y. P e p e r : Rechtspopulismus oder rechter 
Verdruss?, in: KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsy-
chologie, Vol. 38, 2018, p. 535.
40 M. H a n s e n , J. O l s e n : Flesh of the Same Flesh: A Study of Voters 
for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in the 2017 Federal Election, in: 
German Politics, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2019, pp. 1-19.
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as the anti-establishment and anti-migration platforms 
clearly appeal to AfD supporters, the role of economic 
policies in the second period seems much less clear. The 
party itself identifi es its economic policy as a potential 
spirit of discord in a strategy paper for the federal election 
in 2017:
With regard to so far non-decisive topics (this holds 
especially for economic and welfare policy), particular 
attention has to be paid to the fact that the AfD’s elec-
torate is not divided. Whereas parts of the bourgeoisie 
with a liberal-conservative mindset on the one hand 
and the working-class and the unemployed on the 
other hand hold similar views on topics such as Euro/
Europe, security, migration/Islam, democracy, nation-
al identity or genderism, differences can come up on 
questions such as tax equity, the pension level, health 
security contributions, rent control or unemployment 
security. […] If this is not possible, cross references be-
tween core topics and presumably dividing topics have 
to be drawn.41
Anecdotal evidence shows that these strategic con-
siderations are met by proposing welfare chauvinist 
policies subsuming the economic dimension in line with 
Ivarsfl aten:42 Mirroring a broad increase of welfare chau-
vinism in Germany,43 the AfD faction from Thuringia de-
mands higher redistribution and a ‘citizens pension’ – a 
pension increase for which only German citizens would be 
eligible.44 However, the party also endorses a pro-welfare 
positioning comparable to the Front National in France:45 
Far-right faction leader Björn Höcke continues to call the 
AfD ‘the party of social justice’,46 demanding ‘patriot-
ism of solidarity’ and even supporting the foundation of 
right-wing unions like the organisation ‘Alarm’.47 On the 
contrary, scholars supporting the APP theory stress the 
AfD voters’ protest characteristics and neglect the impor-
tance of actual issue positioning – particularly regarding 
economic policy.48 Schwarzbözl und Fatke claim “the AfD 
41 Own translation from: Alternative für Deutschland: Demokratie wie-
derherstellen Dem Volk die Staatsgewalt zurückgeben: Die Strategie 
der AfD für das Wahljahr 2017, 2016.
42 E. I v a r s f l a t e n , op. cit.
43 P. M a r x , E. N a u m a n n : Do right-wing parties foster welfare chau-
vinistic attitudes? A longitudinal study of the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’ in 
Germany, in: Electoral Studies, Vol. 52, 2018, pp. 111-116.
44 AfD Fraktion im Thüringer Landtag: Es geht um Wertschätzung: Ein 
Konzept der AfD-Fraktion im Thüringer Landtag, 2018.
45 A. A f o n s o , L. R e n w a l d , op. cit.
46 R. H a n k : Nationalsoziale Alternative, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Sonntagszeitung, 15 July 2018.
47 A. S c h m e l c h e r : National und sozial, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Sonntagszeitung, 3 November 2019, No. 44; P. M a r x, E. N a u m a n n , 
op. cit.
48 S.T. F r a n z m a n n  (ed.): Parteien und die Politisierung der Europäis-
chen Union, 2018; I. B i e b e r, S. R o ß t e u t s c h e r, P. S c h e re r, op. 
cit.
electorate represents a group of people that is particu-
larly coherent with regard to cultural confl icts, in contrast 
it is rather incoherent with regard to economic confl icts”.49 
Opposingly, Hansen and Olsen fi nd that “AfD voters were 
in the mainstream […] in terms of their attitudes towards 
efforts to reduce inequality and the role of the welfare 
state”.50 Finally, Goerres et al. provide evidence for the old 
Kitschelt and McGann ‘winning formula’: In their analysis, 
AfD supporters have particularly strong anti-redistribu-
tion preferences comparable with the PRRP electorates 
in Switzerland or Norway.51 Such a combination of ‘right’ 
cultural and economic preferences within the electorate 
would enable the party to provide a clear bi-dimensional 
positioning with no need for blurring.
 Data and measurement
In order to analyse AfD’s comparative positioning, the 
German party system’s supply side in the economic and 
cultural dimensions for the legislative period between 
2013 and 2017, the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Surveys 
(CHES) and the 2017 CHES FLASH survey can be used. 
The CHES provides an operationalisation of the economic 
‘left-right’ and cultural libertarian post-materialist dimen-
sion on an 11-point scale. For Germany, the party posi-
tioning is assessed by 13 experts in 2014 and 15 experts 
in 2017. Scholars have applied the standard deviation of 
these experts’ judgements to proxy the degree of strat-
egy blurring.52
In order to evaluate the success of the party’s strategies, 
the perceived party positioning by the German elector-
ate needs to be examined under the consideration of 
the electorate’s own dimensional policy preferences and 
socio-economic control variables. For the legislative pe-
riod between 2013 and 2017, several waves of the German 
Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) representative Long-
term Online Tracking as well as the GLES pre- and post-
election 2017 waves contain the relevant data includ-
ing economic and cultural ‘right-left’ economics on an 
11-point scale. In order to control for APP characteristics 
49 T. S c h w a r z b ö z l , M. F a t k e , op. cit., p. 289.
50 M. H a n s e n , J. O l s e n , op. cit., 2019, p. 15.
51 A. G o e r re s , D.C. S p i e s , S. K u m l i n : The Electoral Supporter Base 
of the Alternative for Germany, in: Swiss Political Science Review, 
Vol. 21, No. 4, 2018, p. 617. See also H. K i t s c h e l t , A. M c G a n n , op. 
cit., 1995.
52 J. R o v n y : Who emphasizes and who blurs? Party strategies in mul-
tidimensional competition, in: European Union Politics, Vol. 13, No. 2, 
2012, pp. 269-292; J. R o v n y : Where do radical…, op. cit.; B. P a l i e r, 
P. M a n o w  (eds.): Electoral Politics and Welfare State Reforms, Ox-
ford 2018, Oxford University Press; K.J. H a n , op. cit.; A. A f o n s o , 
L. R e n w a l d , op. cit. See web Appendix of J. R o v n y : Who empha-
sizes… , op. cit. for several tests approving the use of CHES-based 
standard deviations as a measurement of strategy blurring.




Experts’ issue positioning of German parties in the economic and cultural dimension
N o t e : For an easier graphical representation of Figure 1, the economic scale has been reversed in comparison to the original CHES data.



















































and protest election motives in line with Bieber et al.,53 an 
unweighted index of satisfaction with the established par-
ties on an 11-point scale, an index on democracy dissatis-
faction on an 11-point scale, as well as an ‘Angela Merkel 
sympathy’ index on a 5-point scale is compiled. Group-
ing the respondents over the two relevant periods that 
the AfD went through – divided by the sacking of Bernd 
Lucke in June 2015 – the selected GLES waves provide 
4,123 (7,483) respondents in the fi rst (second) period of 
which 226 (581) claim to vote for the AfD. Rovny applies 
variance ratio tests of the perceived positional disper-
sion of different parties’ voters to identify strategy blurring 
of PRRPs.54 Bartels simply counts the positional ‘don’t 
know’ answers.55 Such analyses might deliver valuable 
indications; they can only be hints for strategy blurring, 
however. Younger parties’ positions in particular might be 
perceived as ambiguous due to voters’ lack of knowledge 
acquired over a longer period of time.
 The GLES dataset allows for the testing of perceived par-
ty-supporter interrelation in a logit model for all respond-
ents i, controlling for the perceived distance, the posi-
tioning preference and the salience in both dimensions 
D – economics and culture. Additionally, APP and socio-
economic characteristics are controlled for. The model is 
run in the founding and radicalisation period P.
53 I. B i e b e r, S. R o ß t e u t s c h e r, P. S c h e re r, op. cit.
54 J. R o v n y : Who emphasizes… , op. cit.
55 L.M. B a r t e l s : Issue Voting Under Uncertainty: An Empirical Test, in: 
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 30, No. 4, 1986, pp. 709-
728.
Pr (AfD support)i,P
 = P + perceived distance i,P,D + preference i,P,D + salience i,P,D  
 + APP characteristics i,P + socio-economics i,P + γEast,P + i,P
Merging the CHES expert judgements into the combined 
GLES waves further allows an analysis of objective party-
supporter distance, fi nally making it possible to test for 
strategy blurring.
Pr (AfD support)i,P
 = P + objective distance i,P,D + preference i,P,D + salience i,P,D 
 + APP characteristics i,P + socio-economics i,P + γEast,P + i,P
The AfD is considered to blur its position in the economic 
dimension if AfD voters had dispersed welfare state pref-
erences and would individually perceive that these prefer-
ences were met by the AfD, whereas objectively (by ex-
pert judgements) this distance was larger between other 
groups of party supporters and their supported party.
Supply side: The AfD de-emphasises its ‘right’ 
economic positioning
The German party system during the legislative period 
between 2013 and 2017 is mapped over the economic 
and cultural dimension based on the CHES expert judge-
ments. The left-hand side of Figure 1 plots the arithme-
tic mean of all expert judgements for both dimensions 
in 2014 and 2017. On the cultural dimension, from liber-
tarian/postmaterialism (‘left’) to traditional/authoritarian 
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(‘right’), the AfD is considered the most extreme party 
on the ‘right’ fringe of the German party system, with the 
Green party being its cultural antagonist on the ‘left’. The 
AfD hence increased the range of cultural positioning in 
Germany and triggered a polarisation in the cultural di-
mension between 2014 and 2017.56 During that time, ex-
perts became exceptionally concordant in their judge-
ments of the AfD’s extreme ‘right’ cultural positioning.
 Whereas the perceived economic positioning of parties 
hardly changes over the observation period, the AfD is as-
sessed as slightly more welfare-friendly in 2017. In 2014, 
the party’s economic policy platform is evaluated as the 
most anti-welfare of all German parties, and in 2017 it 
comes second after the liberal party FDP – providing fi rst 
evidence against an economic shift to the ‘left’. In gen-
eral, experts agree on the parties’ economic positioning. 
For the AfD, the standard deviation in the economic di-
mension even decreases after their cultural radicalisation 
in 2015, and no statistically signifi cant difference in dis-
persion can be found in comparison to other parties. First 
evidence against unidimensional positioning and strategy 
blurring is provided. There is no evidence for a potential 
welfare chauvinism positioning that could be mirrored in 
a rather left-leaning economic positioning in combination 
with a higher dispersion of expert judgements.
These fi ndings differ signifi cantly from the dispersion in 
expert judgements found in the same data source with 
regards to several Western European PRRPs in the eco-
56 Scoring a maximum score of 10 from 7 of 15 experts in 2017 the scale 
is limited in depicting a further radicalisation of the AfD.
nomic dimension:57 The AfD supplies a clear ‘right’ eco-
nomic policy platform. Its entrance into the German party 
system did not alter competition within the two main di-
mensions; It has shifted political competition away from 
the economic dimension, however, by polarising the cul-
tural dimension.
Demand side: AfD supporters oppose redistribution
In order to compare the ‘right’ economic and cultural AfD 
positioning with its supporters’ perception, the demand 
side is analysed. Figure 2 depicts the perceived economic 
German party positioning by the respective party sup-
porters. Between 2013 and 2017, the comparative party 
assessment shows a high level of persistence. In line with 
expert judgements on the economic ‘right’, the party sup-
porters of FDP and AfD keep changing positions. As a 
proxy for the clearness of positioning, again, the stand-
ard deviation reveals that the AfD’s economic positioning 
is perceived as just as clear as other parties’ stances – 
providing further evidence against a single-issue cultural 
positioning.
Unfortunately, the perception analysis is based on a lim-
ited sample as it ignores respondents lacking the knowl-
edge or confi dence to assess the AfD. The share of ‘don’t 
know’ answers of the electorate and AfD supporters in the 
two dimensions is plotted in Figure 3. Starting in 2013, 
around two-thirds of the electorate has refused an as-
sessment in both dimensions. Whereas the share of re-
fusals decreased to only 6% in the cultural dimension, in 
57  A. A f o n s o , L. R e n w a l d , op. cit.; K.J. H a n , op. cit.; J. R o v n y : Who 
emphasizes… ,  op. cit.
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2017 it persisted at around 40% in the economic dimen-
sion. The same trend is refl ected in the AfD supporters’ 
responses: Whereas the share of ‘don’t know’ answers in 
the cultural dimension dissolved from 22% to around 2%, 
around one-quarter of AfD supporters still ‘didn’t know’ 
the party’s economic positioning in 2017.
Since ‘don’t know’ responses can indicate strategy blur-
ring, this subgroup of AfD supporters is analysed further.58 
Especially after 2015, AfD supporters who ‘don’t know’ 
the party’s economic positioning are poorer, less edu-
cated and have a lower self-classifi ed social class. Their 
preferences for redistribution are indistinguishable from 
the rest of the AfD supporters, and their own economic 
salience is lower. Hence, in line with Rovny,59 rather than 
being outsmarted by a blurred positioning, it is more likely 
that this group of 25% of AfD supporters simply does not 
care about redistribution. Given their preferences, how-
ever, the party is as good of a pick for them as for the rest 
of the AfD party supporters.
In order to evaluate the interplay between party support-
ers’ perceived party positioning and their own preferenc-
es, party supporters’ issue preferences in the economic 
and cultural dimensions have to be taken into account. 
The author provides an overview of self-ranked class and 
economic policy preferences. In contrast to the slightly 
decreasing social class of AfD supporters over time, eco-
nomic policy preferences within the different groups are 
not altered. In line with rational choice voting, lower social 
class is associated with higher preferences for redistribu-
tion. Impressively, however, the lower-class AfD support-
58 See L.M. B a r t e l s , op. cit.
59 J. R o v n y : Who emphasizes… , op. cit.
ers oppose redistribution more strongly than non-AfD 
supporters in the (self-declared) upper middle class and 
even upper class. The party supporters’ preferences are 
mirror images of the perceived party positioning and con-
fi rm evidence initially brought forward by Goerres et al.: 
AfD voters do not have particularly heterogeneous eco-
nomic preferences – leaving little potential for strategy 
blurring.60 Given the comparatively low socio-economic 
position of the AfD electorate, the anti-redistribution pref-
erences confl ict with rational choice voting theory and 
traditional class-based voting.61
In the cultural dimension, AfD supporters homogeneously 
have radical ‘right’ preferences displaced from the aver-
age preferences of all other groups. The co-movement of 
the cultural radicalisation and the strong homogeneity of 
preferences are reinforced after 2015. Although the AfD 
polarises the German party system, this does not auto-
matically lead to a polarisation of the electorate. Instead, 
the party attracts supporters with radical ‘right’ cultural 
and economic preferences who lacked political represen-
tation.
Summing up, the AfD is placed on the ‘right’ edge of the 
German party system in the dimensions of economics 
and culture by experts as well as by its own supporters. 
The above analysis of the supporters’ own economic 
preferences shows that in line with the AfD’s positional 
placement, its supporters have signifi cantly more ‘right’ 
economic policy preferences than most of the elector-
ate. This also holds for those supporters who ‘don’t know’ 
the AfD’s position in the economic dimension. AfD voters 
seem to vote against their economic interests, however, 
in line with their preferences in the economic dimension. 
Hence, fi rst evidence is brought forward for the old win-
ning formula.
Supply meets demand: Evidence for the old winning 
formula
In an attempt to shed light on the mechanism behind 
AfD support, a logit regression isolates the effects of the 
economic and cultural dimension, controlling for vari-
ous socio-economic variables and measures of a protest 
vote. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 quantify the probability 
to support the AfD given the absolute perceived distance 
between a respondent’s position and her or his percep-
tion of the supported party’s position for the two periods 
analysed.
60 A. G o e r re s , D.C. S p i e s , S. K u m l i n , op. cit.
61 The table providing an overview of self-ranked class and economic 
policy preferences is available upon request.
Figure 3
Share of ‘don’t know’ answers concerning the AfD’s 
economic and cultural positioning
N o t e : *Pre- and post-election wave 2017.
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After controlling for two-dimensional preferences, socio-
economic controls and measuring the protest vote, cul-
tural and economic ‘right’ preferences increase the prob-
ability of AfD support. In the founding period, AfD sup-
porters were more successful than other party supporters 
in minimising the perceived distance to their supported 
party in both dimensions. In the radicalisation period, 
they became much better in the cultural dimension and 
as successful as other party supporters in the economic 
dimension. The effect of ‘right’ cultural preferences is four 
times stronger than that of ‘right’ economic preferences. 
Nevertheless, ‘right’ economic preferences matter.
The socio-economic controls show the expected signs. 
In line with the literature, support for the AfD increased 
among lower-income households, married respondents 
as well as respondents in Eastern Germany. AfD sup-
porters are less satisfi ed with the established parties and 
democracy, and after 2015, view Angela Merkel as less 
sympathetic than other party supporters. Hence, the 
claim that AfD supporters only care about voicing protest 
can be rejected. In the radicalisation period, 50% of the 
variation in the dependent variable is explained by the di-
mensional distance and preference variables as well as 
the included socio-economic and protest vote controls.
The regression results from columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 
are shown as predictive margins in Figure 4. During the 
founding period, the predictive margins for AfD support 
decrease over an increasing perceived distance to the 
supported party. The coeffi cients of perceived cultural 
and economic distances are comparable. Comparing 
a respondent with a maximum (10) to minimum (0) per-
ceived distance to the supported party ceteris paribus in-
creases the probability of supporting the AfD by around 
fi ve percentage points. During the radicalisation period, 
the perceived cultural proximity strongly gained in impor-
tance (represented by the steep negatively sloped line). 
In the economic dimension, AfD supporters became in-
distinguishable over all distances (represented by the fl at 
line). A ceteris paribus maximum reduction of perceived 
cultural distance to the supported party increases the 
Figure 4
Predictive margins logit regressions, perceived supporter-party distance, with 95% CIs 
Table 1 Columns 1 and 2
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Predictive margins logit regressions, distance to expert judgements, with 95% CIs
Table 1 Columns 3 and 4
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Economic distance to expert judgements of party support 
probability of AfD support by close to 15 percentage 
points.
As a fi nal analysis of potential strategy blurring, columns 
3 and 4 of Table 1 present the logit regression outputs 
of AfD support including the distance of respondents’ 
dimensional preferences to the parties’ objective expert 
assessments. Not relying on the respondents’ party as-
sessments solves the shortcoming of dropping all po-
sitional ‘don’t know’ answers resulting in around 30% 
more observations before and 20% more observations 
after 2015. The results are comparable with those in col-
umns 1 and 2: Again, there is a higher probability for re-
spondents with more ‘right’ preferences in the economic 
and cultural dimension to support the AfD – with the 
latter effect being much stronger than the former. Re-
garding the distance of AfD supporters’ preferences to 
positional expert judgements, AfD supporters are char-
acterised by a distinctive cultural proximity to their party. 
Importantly, the economic objective distance became 
indistinguishable from other party supporters during the 
radicalisation period. In the second period, the results 
explain over 60% of the variation in the dependent vari-
able.
Figure 5 shows the logit regression results reported in 
columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 as predictive margins. A high-
er cultural proximity to expert judgements was a strong 
indicator of AfD support already during the party’s found-
ing. From a medium distance (5) to a minimum distance 
(0), the respective probability increased by around 20 
percentage points before and by 25 percentage points 
after 2015. The proximity of AfD’s expert placements in 
the cultural dimension and the AfD supporters’ homoge-
neous cultural preferences are exceptional. The increas-
ing objective distance in the economic dimension in the 
founding period could be explained by the integration of 
respondents with little economic interest (‘don’t know’ or 
‘don’t care’). As AfD supporters become indistinguishable 
in their economic party-supporter distance, there is very 
little interpretational room for a need of economic strat-
egy blurring. Even during the radicalisation period, AfD 
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2
Perceived economic 







distance to support 
party
-0.206*    
(0.057)
   -0.428***
(0.056)
Ecopnomic distance 
to expert judgements 
of support party




Cultural distance to 
expert judgements of 
support party
   -0.786***
(0.131)




   -0.238***
(0.055) 




   -0.142***
 (0.033)
Own cultural position      0.224***
 (0.056)
    0.415***
(0.050)
    0.483***
(0.105)




   -0.555***
(0.081)








    0.726***
(0.150)
    0.467***
(0.100)
    0.690***
(0.125)






   -0.211***
(0.029)
   -0.108***
(0.034)




   
East Germany 
Dummy
   
Observations 1,959 3,439 2,507 4,055
Adjusted R-squared 0.301 0.489 0.369 0.624
Robust se in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
objective economic proximity has mattered just as much 
for AfD supporters as for supporters of other parties. The 
results hold for Western and Eastern Germany alike.
In contrast to providing evidence for strategy blurring, this 
analysis stresses the AfD’s winning formula of a strongly 
emphasised ‘right’ cultural and a less emphasised ‘right’ 
economic positioning, while at the same time enabling its 
supporters to protest. AfD supporters’ systemic discon-
tentment does not reduce them to issue-free party follow-
ers as even AfD supporters who ‘don’t know’ the party’s 
economic positioning are well represented. For its politi-
cal competitors, this clearly means that during the 2013-
2017 legislative period, strong redistribution and econom-
ic policy for social justice had little chance of convincing 
AfD supporters. A feasible AfD competitor supporting 
redistribution and coming along with a credible anti-sys-
tem appeal or ‘right’ cultural policies would still struggle 
to convince AfD supporters. As none of the established 
parties in Germany can credibly adopt such a positioning 
and the AfD has left behind its pure protest character, the 
party is unlikely to be challenged from within the existing 
party system.
Nevertheless, there is a chance that the party may change 
its positioning away from its current winning formula to-
wards a more ‘left’ economic policy offer. This could 
particularly happen once far-right faction leader Hoecke 
fi nally manages to marginalise the formerly infl uential lib-
eral economists within the party leadership and to build 
up a ‘party of social justice’.62 Whether such a shift could 
improve the parties’ electoral success is questionable 
given the fi ndings of the present study. In Western Europe 
the AfD’s winning formula directed also at supporters with 
low income positions remains an exception. However, a 
similar set of political attitudes confl icting with economic 
interests has been discussed in the ‘What’s the matter 
with Kansas’ debate:63 A strict refusal of state interven-
tions including the welfare state and climate change regu-
lations can be found among radical supporters of the Re-
publican Party who hold low socio-economic positions in 
different regions of the USA.64
62 R. H a n k , op. cit.
63 T. F r a n k : What’s the matter with Kansas?: How conservatives won 
the heart of America, New York 2004, Henry Holt and Co.
64 A.R. H o c h s c h i l d : Strangers in their own land: anger and mourning 
on the American right, New York 2016, The New Press.
supporters are clearly not tricked into endorsing the party 
due to a misinterpretation of the party’s economic posi-
tioning. Since ‘right’ economic and cultural preferences 
remain signifi cant after controlling for protest support, the 
AfD gets support because of and not despite its issue po-
sitioning.
Conclusions
The regression analysis reveals that cultural and econom-
ic ‘right’ preferences indicate higher chances of support 
for the AfD – albeit the effect of the cultural dimension is 
four times stronger. Even after 2015, the perceived and 
Table 1
Logit regression AfD voting intentions, perceived 
and objective distance
N o t e s : Splitting the sample into East and West Germany and limiting the 
sample to pre- and post-election study in order to apply sample weights 
does not qualitatively alter the results. Further regression outputs may be 
provided upon request.
